ETSI Security Conference 2023 Presentation - Implementing Design Practices with the Goal to Prevent Consumer IoT Enabled Coercive Control

 This post shares a summary of of presentation I gave at the ETSI Security Conference 2023 on implementing Design Practices with the Goal to Prevent Consumer IoT Enabled Coercive Control. 

Introduction

An Overview of ETSI EG 203 936 - Implementing Design Practices to Mitigate Consumer IoT-Enabled Coercive Control.
ETSI Guide that recommends initial design practices to minimise the potential of coercive control by consumer Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
The guide provides emerging design practices through examples and explanatory text for organisations involved in the development and manufacturing of Consumer IoT devices and associated services.

Understanding Consumer IoT Enabled Coercive Control

Coercive control is entrapment in personal life, and it pertains to the set of control skills also used in other situations of captivity such as hostage situations and human trafficking to override autonomy and the sense of self and entrap a person.
The misuse of novel telecommunications applications such as smartphones, tablets, social media, wearables, smart speakers, telecare systems, internet connected cars, internet connected home appliances, smart locks, smart thermostats and home security systems in the context of coercive control within intimate relationships often known as Consumer IoT Enabled abuses.
These behaviours include but are not limited to stalking and omnipresence, surveillance (wiretapping, bugging, videotaping, geolocation tracking, data mining, social media mapping, and the monitoring of data and traffic on the internet), intimidation, impersonation, humiliation, threats, consistent harassment/unwanted contact, sexting, and image-based sexual abuse.
Types of Consumer IoT enabled Abuse
Toxic content covers a wide range of attacks involving media that attackers send to a target or audience—e.g., bullying, trolling, threats of violence, and sexual harassment.
Content leakage involves any scenario where an attacker leaks (or threatens to leak) sensitive, private information to a wider audience, typically with the intent to embarrass, threaten, intimidate, or punish the target.
Overloading includes any scenario wherein an attacker forces a target to triage myriad notifications or comments via amplification, or otherwise makes it technically infeasible for the target to participate online due to jamming a channel.
False reporting broadly captures scenarios where an attacker deceives a reporting system or emergency service—originally intended to protect people—to falsely accuse a target of abusive behaviour.
Impersonation occurs when an attacker relies on deception of an audience to assume the online persona of a target to create content that will damage the target’s reputation or inflict emotional harm.
Surveillance involves an attacker leveraging privileged access to a target’s devices or accounts to monitor the target’s activities, location, or communication.
Lockout and control involves scenarios where an attacker leverages privileged access to a target’s account or device—including computers, or Consumer IoT devices—to gaslight the target or interfere with how they engage with the world.
Coercive Control-Resistant Design
Coercive Control-Resistant Design can be defined as safeguarding or designing products with anti abuse protections by default to minimise attackers’ ability to use these tools to harm targets whilst not limiting the access to the device functionality by the intended user. 

These include but are not limited to:

1.Build consensus and awareness on the nature of the problem.
2.Identify dilemmas and build consensus on acceptable solutions.
3.Harm considerations “built in, not bolted on”.
4.Minimise risks of harms arising.
5.Disrupt harms that have arisen.
6.Diverse design team.
7.Privacy and Choice.
8.Combat Gaslighting.
9.Security and Data.

Implementing Coercive Control-Resistant Design
Online Harms Policy
There is an expectation from user that companies will have measures in place to ensure duty of care to keep their users safe from harm.
Security and Safety of Consumer IoT design
No universal default passwords in consumer smart products.
Device producers should establish and maintain a vulnerability disclosure policy. This means there would be a clear route for users to report security vulnerabilities when they are discovered, and a process for remediation.
The device producers should explicitly state how long a product will receive software security updates for.
Threat modelling paired with usability analysis for the design and development of safer systems.
Incorporating privacy and security by default, during the design process.
Companies should get users’ permission before collecting and sharing location data. So, this could mean disabled by default. Also, they should inform users how they can stop the collection of such information, and its deletion if requested which is under GPDR right to be forgotten. 
Technology Design
Diversity. Ensuring a diverse design team to broaden the understanding of user habits.
Privacy and choice. Allowing users to make informed choices about their privacy settings.
User Awareness. Making it clear when settings have been changed and how this affects the functionality of the devices.
Security and data. Ensuring that products only collect and share necessary data, limiting the risk that data are used maliciously.
User Experience. Giving users greater confidence to use technology by making it simpler to understand, limiting the risk of attackers exploiting a target’s lack of technical ability.
Education and Resources
Many organisations have produced guidance on the safe use of technologies and how individuals can implement better privacy protections. Some organisations have also produced specific guidance on technology abuse for the targets (victims) and professionals working with targets (victims). These include guidance on how to document technology abuse, information about spyware and surveillance, and guidance on privacy and security features of social media platforms.
Role Technology can Play in Supporting Targets
Technology can offer a lifeline to targets, enabling them to access support services and information. It can also provide a way for them to record evidence of their abuse. There are different ways in which technology may help targets including:
Finding information.
Accessing support services and networks.
Connecting with other targets.
Gathering evidence.
Protecting and alerting targets.

Conclusion
A public draft of 'ETSI EG 203 936 - Implementing Design Practices to Mitigate Consumer IoT-Enabled Coercive Control' is available for comments and review. See Here.  Also, a link to the full presentation from the ETSI site is here.


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